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Abstract

The cyber attacks on Estonia in late April and the early weeks of May 2007
significantly

crippled

the

country,

preventing

it

from

performing

banking,

communications, news reporting, government transactions and command and control
activities. Estonia is considered a “Wired Society”, much like the United States. Both
countries rely on the cyberspace infrastructure economically and politically. Estonia
sought assistance outside the country to recover from and to address the attacks. The
cyber attacks on Estonia focused world-wide attention on the effects that cyberspace
attacks could have on countries. If a cyber attack of national significance occurred
against the United States, what would the United States do? The Department of Defense
is responsible for protecting the nation and its geographical boundaries from attack, but
what is DoD’s role for securing the United States’ cyberspace? Research was conducted
by studying national orders, strategies, policies plans, and doctrine to determine DoD’s
role for securing the United States’ cyberspace. Research revealed that DoD is assigned
the lead role as Sector Specific Agency (SSA) for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). As
the lead SSA for the DIB, DoD’s role for securing the United States’ cyberspace is to
identify, assess, and improve risk management of the critical infrastructure within the
DIB. Our nation’s defense and military strength rely on the DoD which in turn relies on
the DIB to enable DoD to perform its mission. Participation by the DIB is on a voluntary
basis, with DIB participants making the risk management calls and implementing the
strategies that best fit their needs, which may not serve national security objectives.
iv
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DOD ROLE FOR SECURING UNITED STATES CYBERSPACE

I. Introduction
1.1. Motivation for Research
For several weeks in May 2007, it was widely reported in the news that cyber
attacks were being committed against Estonia by creating a distributed denial-of-service
(DDOS) on Estonia’s national infrastructure (government, financial, and commercial
websites) [1]. The attackers of Estonia’s infrastructure used Botnets to perform the
DDOS. Botnets are networks of remote-controlled zombie computers. The owners/users
of these zombie computers are not aware that their computers are being used for these
types of activities [2].

Estonia first realized it was under attack when government and

banking transactions ceased to work globally within the country. One of Estonia’s largest
banks reported losses of at least $1 million dollars during the cyber attacks [3].
Estonia's defense minister, Mr. Jaak Aaviksoo, reported that more than 1 million
computers worldwide had been used over several weeks to attack Estonian government
and business Web site. At first, it appeared that Russia was behind the cyber attacks as
several of the attacking Internet Protocol (IP) addresses were publicly identified as
Russian government IP addresses, but later analysis did not bear this out.

Estonia

requested assistance from NATO, as these attacks could have been seen as an act of war,
even though it was clear who was behind the attacks.
1

NATO sent several cyber experts to Estonia to assist in determining where the
attacks originated and to further strengthen the cyber security procedures already in
place. Analysis of these attacks categorized them as “cyber riots”.

Eventually, the

attacks were traced back to an Estonian student, and seven months later in January 2008,
the 20-year-old Estonian hacker was fined approximately $1,620.00 for the cyber attack
[4]. The scales of justice do not seem very equal when comparing the fine to the amount
of losses incurred by just one of Estonia’s banks.
Now, substitute the United States for Estonia. The U.S. relies on information
technologies from the simplest task of making a phone call using voice over internet
protocol (VOIP) to deploying a weapon against an adversary. Today's interconnected
systems and networks allow us to operate around the world through cyberspace within a
matter of seconds exposing our infrastructure to cyberspace threats affecting our national
security, public safety and personal privacy.
Table 1 provides the number of internet users and country population for Estonia
[5] and the United States as of 30 November 2007 [6].
Table 1: Internet Statistics for Estonia and United States
(Source: Internet World Stats Usage and Population Statistics)
Country
Population # Internet Users % Users
United States (US) 301,139,947
215,088,545
71.4
Estonia (EE)

1,315,912

760,000

57.8

Comparing the number of cyber users between the two countries, the United
States has nearly 300 times as many internet users as Estonia. While direct comparisons
are difficult to make, it is clear that a similar type of cyber attack against the United
States could affect significantly more people, impacting the safety, morale, and security
2

of our American citizens as well as our nation’s economy. If the United States
experienced cyber attacks of the same intensity as Estonia’s, what role would DoD have
in securing the United States’ cyberspace from cyber attacks? How could we be sure who
is attacking in a timely matter and the intent of the attack? In conventional warfare one
can ascertain who performed the attack by examining the delivery method and materials
in a timely matter. A cyber attack is more difficult to attribute, and the differences
between warlike and criminal acts are blurred.
The threats still exist for an adversary to physically attack the United States, but a
skilled cyberspace state or non-state adversary could strike at the heart of America’s
homeland remotely and anonymously. Our reliance on the power and capabilities of
Information Technology (IT), which may contain vulnerabilities exploitable by an
adversary, could ultimately be our weakness, our Achilles Heel.
“Today, the cyber economy is the economy. And I don't mean the dot coms. I mean
virtually every vital service -- water supply, transportation, energy, banking and
finance, telecommunications, public health. All of these rely upon computers and the
fiber-optic lines, switches and routers that connect them. Corrupt those networks,
and you disrupt the nation. It is a paradox of our times: the very technology that
makes our economy so dynamic and our military forces so dominating -- also makes
us more vulnerable. …. And everyday it is driven home to us that the threat is not just
theoretical....Protecting our nation's critical infrastructure can only be done in
concert with private industry” [7].
The United States relies on cyberspace for the simplest of day-to-day activities to
the most complex activities. Our national security, public health and safety, economic
well-being, and way of life depend on the critical infrastructures and key resources being
available to us in cyberspace. Our government and military rely on cyberspace to
perform its missions. Our commerce relies on cyberspace to conduct its activities.

3

The typical citizen relies on cyberspace for day-to-day activities. With the
advances in technology over the last twenty years, people can now perform video
teleconferencing (VTC), make phone calls around the world and connect to local wireless
networks available in various cities around the world. Our nation’s citizens rely on
cyberspace to pay bills, purchase merchandise, groceries, and fuel, buy and sell stocks,
file government taxes online, manage financial accounts (savings, checking, loan
application requests and repayment plans), participate in government elections, and
communicate via email and Voice over IP (VOIP). Global Positioning Systems (GPS)
provide highly accurate position, velocity, and time navigation information to users via
cyberspace. Cyberspace supports transportation on the ground, in the air, on the water,
under the water, and in space. Cyberspace is used to provide information to consumers,
filter and provide the safe water that we consume on a daily basis, provide comfortable
environments to work in, and defend our country against adversaries.
“Cyber is the United States’ Center of Gravity--the hub of all power and
movement, upon which everything else depends. It is the Nation’s neural
network” [8].

1.2. Problem Statement
This research attempts to determine what role the DoD performs in securing the
United States’ homeland cyberspace. This paper explores the strategies and plans put in
place to prevent a cyberspace attack from occurring against the United States’ critical
infrastructures and affecting the national security and safety. The research examines the
government’s chain of command to determine if clear lines of command are in place so
that if a cyberspace attack occurred against the nation’s critical infrastructures, someone
4

would be in charge and be able to direct actions from the “big picture” perspective, as
well as provide information sharing with all the key players. The nation does not want a
repeat of government failure to take action when a national disaster occurs such as the
Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
Congress investigated the disastrous Hurricane Katrina incident that occurred in
August 2005 and released a report titled “A Failure of Initiative” which detailed the lack
of actions by top level government managers to address a national crisis. That report
sited numerous problem areas throughout the federal and state governments. One major
finding was that “Communications between DOD and DHS, and in particularly FEMA,
during the immediate week after landfall, reflect a lack of information sharing, near
panic, and problems with process” [9].
1.3. Research Questions
This research will first explore the DoD’s role for securing the United States’
homeland. This will be done by analyzing the strategic and national policies and legal
authorities. Next the research answers the question of what is DoD’s role for securing the
United States’ cyberspace. To answer this question, the research uses the following
investigative questions:
•

What is DoD’s role for securing the United States homeland critical infrastructure
from cyber attack?

•

What support can DoD provide to civil authorities to respond and recover from
cyber attack?

•

Can/should the National Guard and reserve members’ roles be expanded to
support cyberspace roles and functions?

5

The research first studies the laws, national strategies, policies, plans and
guidelines that are in place for DoD to secure the United States. The research then
explores DoD’s role for securing the United States’ cyberspace, how DoD can work with
other agencies to respond to and recover from cyberspace attacks, and the feasibility of
expanding the National Guard and reserve members roles for performing cyberspace
functions.
1.4. Scope
The scope for this thesis is centered on the DoD role, without special regard to a
specific branch of service. Branches of service may be mentioned, but only to support a
point being made in the research paper. The research also focuses on national cyberspace
defense and not offensive or expeditionary operations.
1.5. Methodology
The research will consist of referencing the types of documents, web resources,
and training materials associated with securing the United States’ cyberspace. A content
analysis and a critical review of published national and strategic policies and guidance
directives will be performed for tracing DoD’s responsibilities to defend the United
States homeland and secure the United States’ cyberspace. This research will attempt to
determine if adequate plans are in place for DoD to secure the United States’ cyberspace.
Based on the findings, it will make recommendations to prevent a “cyberspace Hurricane
Katrina” from occurring.
Throughout the research effort, many definitions of cyberspace were found. This
research uses the official DoD definition: “Cyberspace is a domain characterized by the
6

use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data
via networked systems and associated infrastructures” [10].
1.6. Limitations
The time limit for completing this thesis was based on a six-month window out of
an 18 month program.

Additional limitations for this thesis are, that during the course

of this research and before being published, new laws, guidelines, policies may be put
into place, causing some of the research and conclusions to be overcome by events. The
information presented in this thesis is publicly available; however, due to the nature of
the Cyber Storm exercise, some of the exercise results may be withheld from the public
due to national security.
1.7. Research Outline
Chapter I provides the background for this thesis. It covers the need for this type
of research, the problem statement, the research objectives, the scope, methodology, and
limitations of this research.
Chapter II provides a literature review of national laws, strategies, directives and
plans guiding the DoD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for defending
the United States’ cyberspace.
Chapter III examines more closely the literature providing guidance to the DoD
and DHS organizations. It explores the research and investigative questions to determine
if documentation exists to address DoD’s role for securing the United States’ cyberspace.
If the documentation exists, this chapter provides the answers to the research and
investigative questions.
7

Chapter IV examines the answers to the research and investigative questions for
strengths and weaknesses and provides a gap analysis with recommendations for
addressing perceived deficiencies.
Chapter V provides the conclusions based on the research findings and includes
recommendations for future research.
Appendix A provides an Acronym List, and Appendix B provides a list of Terms
and Definitions.
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II. Literature review

2.1. Introduction
This chapter summarizes the literature reviewed to answer the research and
investigative questions. The methodology used to identify the documents for literature
review consisted of researching areas that related to cyberspace, DoD roles, homeland
defense and security, and critical infrastructures. It is important to understand what
national security is before delving into the national orders, strategies, directives and
plans. This chapter defines national security and then discusses the national orders,
strategies, directives and plans pertinent to the problem of securing and defending the
nation’s cyberspace information infrastructure. It provides a summary of the purpose for
each order, strategy, directive and plan, detailing who generated the document, when it
was generated, and why it was generated.

These documents will be reviewed and

discussed in more detail in Chapter III, as needed. A summary of the literature review is
provided at the end of this chapter.
2.2. National Security
“If the attacking side secretly...launches a sneak attack against its financial markets,
then after causing a financial crisis, buries a computer virus and hack detachment in
the opponent's computer system in the advance, while at the same time carrying out a
network attack against the enemy so that the civilian electricity network, traffic
dispatching network, financial transaction network, telephone communications
network, and mass media network are completely paralyzed, this will cause the
enemy nation to fall into social panic, street riots, and a political crisis” [11].

9

National security is about protecting the sovereignty of our nation, defending our
borders, and promoting and embracing our American way of life.

This includes

protecting our nation from attack whether from other nation states or non-nation states
and defeating our adversaries, if required and protecting our way of life. Our nation
leverages its instruments of national power--Diplomatic, Information, Military and
Economic (DIME) to wield influence and promote our national security interests.
The National Security Act of 1947 provided a comprehensive program for the
security of the United States by establishing the National Security Council; Secretary of
Defense; a National Military Establishment; Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force; and coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other
departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security [12].
The following sections examine the national strategies, directives, plans and
orders that provide guidance to our great nation, concentrating on critical infrastructure
and cyberspace.
2.3. National Orders, Strategies, Directives and Plans
Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 (9/11),
executive orders, national strategies, directives and plans were issued for protecting the
nation’s homeland and critical infrastructure. This section presents these orders,
strategies, directives and plans in the chronological timeline that they were issued in
order to assist the reader in following the history of securing the nation’s homeland and
its cyberspace infrastructure. Executive orders and national strategies provide the
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guidance for leveraging our nation’s instruments of national power (DIME). The
National Security Strategy (NSS) provides the overarching strategy for guiding our
nation. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) defines strategic objectives to support the
NSS and provides the high-level guidance for development of the National Military
Strategy (NMS). The NMS defines national military objectives based on the NSS, NDS,
and the current security environment. DoD Directives provide guidance to DoD
organizations for performing their assigned duties and responsibilities. National plans
provide guidance for securing and responding to incidents of national significance.
An outline of these orders, national strategies, directives and plans are listed
below.
Executive Order 13231 - Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age
Executive Order (EO) 13231- Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information
Age, issued by the White House on Oct 16, 2001, provided the policy for protecting the
information systems for the nations’ critical infrastructures [13]. This order updated the
United States Code Title 50 – War and National Defense. USC Title 50 created the
National Defense Council for coordination of industries and resources for the nation’s
security and well-being [14].
National Strategy for Homeland Security
The National Strategy for Homeland Security, issued by the White House in July
2002, is the first Homeland Security document to be released [15]. It complemented the
National Security Strategy of the United States by addressing terrorism within the United

11

States. The National Strategy for Homeland Security establishes the foundation for
organizing the nation’s efforts to secure the US homeland from terrorist attack. It also
provides initial guidance on how to achieve this goal.
Homeland Security Act of 2002
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, issued on 25 November 2002, established
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and defined its mission [16]. United
States Code (USC) Title 6 – Domestic Security is also referred to as the Homeland
Security Act 2002.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5
HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, issued by the White House on 28
February 2003, assigned the Secretary of Defense Homeland Security as the lead federal
official for coordinating resources and responding to homeland incidents generated by
terrorist attacks, major disasters and other types of emergencies [17]. HSPD-5
established the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) to provide a consistent
nationwide approach for Federal, state and local governments to work together to prepare
for and respond to and recover from domestic incidents.
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, issued in February 2003 by the
White House [18], is an implementing component of the National Strategy for Homeland
Security [19] and is complemented by The National Strategy for the Physical Protection
of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets [20].
12

The National Strategy to Secure

Cyberspace encourages Americans to secure the portions of cyberspace that they own,
operate, control, or interact with. The government cannot do it alone.
National Strategy for the Physical Protection of CI and Key Assets
The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures (CI)
and Key Assets, issued in February 2003 by the White House, identifies the national
goals and outlines guiding principles to secure the nation’s critical infrastructures and key
assets [20]. This strategy complements the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7
HSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection,
issued 17 December 2003, established national policy for identifying and prioritizing US
critical infrastructures and key resources and protecting them [21]. HSPD-7 identified
the roles and responsibilities for Secretary of Department of Homeland Security and also
documented DoD as the sector-specific lead agency for the Defense Industrial Base.
The National Military Strategy of the United States of America
The National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America, issued in
2004, derives its objectives from the NSS, NDS and the current security environment
[22]. The current security environment consists of four types of challenges: (1)
Traditional: state employs recognized military capabilities; (2) Irregular: Use of
unconventional methods to counter stronger opponent; (3) Catastrophic: Use of Weapons
of Mass Destruction or producing WMD-like effects; and (4) Disruptive: Use of
technology to affect Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR): for example – a
13

cyberspace attack. NMS states its three military objects as: (1) Protect the United States
against external attacks and aggression; (2) Prevent conflict and surprise attack; and (3)
Prevail against adversaries. Preventing conflict and surprise cyber attacks address the
disruptive challenges of our nation’s current security environment.
National Response Plan
The National Response Plan, issued by DHS in December 2004, establishes a
comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management [23]. It
includes prevention, preparedness, response and recovery guidance, for responding to
attacks, disasters, and other emergencies of national significance. Incident annexes are
provided for responding to Biological, Catastrophic, Cyber, Food and Agriculture,
Nuclear and Radiological, Oil and Hazardous Materials, and Terrorism Incident Law
Enforcement and Investigation events. The Cyber Incident Annex provides the
framework for responding to cyber incidents of national significance.
The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States of America, issued by
DoD in March 2005, states the Department of Defense’s four strategic objectives for
supporting the United States’ National Security Strategy as: (1) Secure the United States
from Direct Attack; (2) Secure Strategic Access and Retain Global Freedom of Action;
(3) Strengthen Alliances and Partnerships; and (4) Establish Favorable Security
Conditions [24]. The NDS provides high-level guidance for development of the National
Military Strategy. Establishing favorable security conditions includes securing

14

cyberspace, and making it less vulnerable to exploits by adversaries. The NDS advocates
using an active layered defense in protecting the United States’ national security.
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support
The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, issued by DoD in June
2005, supports guidance from the National Security Strategy, the National Defense
Strategy, and the National Strategy for Homeland Security [25]. It performs the
following activities to secure the United States from direct attack:
•

Lead – At National Command Authority (NCA) direction, execute military
missions to deter, dissuade, and defeat attacks on our nation, population, defense
critical infrastructure

•

Support – At NCA direction, provide support to civil authorities

•

Enable – Share expertise and technology with military & civilian entities

DoD Directive 3020.40 Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP)
DoD Directive 3020.40, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program, issued in August
2005, implements Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) to function as
the Sector Specific Agency (SSA) for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) [26]. The
Director of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is assigned the lead
agent role for the DIB. The DoD, as the lead SSA for the DIB critical infrastructure
sector, has the responsibilities to collaborate with all relevant departments, agencies, and
private sector entities, conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sector, and
encourage risk management strategies to protect and mitigate attack effects.

15

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
“There was a time when two oceans seemed to provide protection from problems
in other lands, leaving America to lead by example alone. That time has long
since passed. America cannot know peace, security, and prosperity by retreating
from the world. America must lead by deed as well as by example. This is how
we plan to lead, and this is the legacy we will leave to those who follow” [27:49].

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America is updated
as needed and was last released in March 2006 by the White House. It emphasizes
making the world a safer better place, promoting activities for developing relationships
with allies, partners, and friends, and documents the need for securing and against
preventing attacks on the United States, and to work with other organizations and nations
for providing a more secure environment for all to flourish and prosper [27:1-3].
National Infrastructure Protection Plan
DHS published the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) in 2006 based
on the requirements in the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) [28].
The NIPP provides the unifying structure for integrating CI/KR protection into a single
national program. HSPD-7 designated various Sector Specific Agencies (SSAs) for DHS
to coordinate with for the nation’s Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR).
Defense Industrial Base: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources SSP
The Defense Industrial Base: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector
Specific Plan, issued by DoD and DHS in May 2007, implements HSPD-7 direction for
DoD to serve as lead Sector Specific Agency (SSA) for the Defense Industrial Base
(DIB) [29]. As the lead SSA for the DIB, the DoD works closely with the DIB members
16

to identify critical assets, assess risk, and improve the sector’s risk management posture.
This SSP defines the DIB as
“The Department of Defense, U.S. Government, and private sector worldwide
industrial complex with capabilities to perform research and develop, produce,
deliver, and maintain military weapon systems, subsystems, components, or parts to
meet military requirements necessary to fulfill the National Military Strategy (NMS).
The DIB is comprised of hundreds of thousands of industrial sites. The
preponderance of the DIB is privately owned and comprised of businesses of all
sizes” [29:5].
2.4. Summary
This chapter provided a literature review and introduction of the national orders,
strategies, directives, and plans that apply to securing and defending the United States
critical infrastructures in cyberspace.
Chapter III examines the research methodology used to answer our research and
investigative questions and delves more deeply into those documents that provide the
answers to our research and investigative questions.

17

III. Methodology
3.1. Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to focus on the way in which the research was
conducted. The literature review served as the foundation for this thesis, highlighting the
key documents studied.
The research methodology consisted of the following activities:
•

Reviewed the DoD and DHS organization structure

•

Identified literature relevant to this research by performing searches of
these related terms: “cyberspace, cyber war, cyber attack, homeland
security, homeland defense, United States cyberspace, DoD role”, which
led to perform further document searches on “national strategy, national
security, national defense, and defense industrial base”

•

Reduced the amount of identified relevant literature for this research to
the subset identified in Chapter II

•

Applied knowledge gained from AFIT graduate studies

•

Traced DoD guidance for securing United States cyberspace through the
national orders, strategies, directives and plans.

•

Use identified literature to answer research and investigative questions

•

Introduced reports on nation’s cyberspace exercise and DoD status of its
risk management methodology for DIB critical infrastructure

This research examines the DoD’s chain of command and discusses the high-level
DoD components. The research then examines the DHS’s organization structure, with
regards to protection of the nation’s cyberspace infrastructure. Next the research utilizes
the research and investigative questions to examine the documents identified in the
literature review in Chapter II. The research explores the research question regarding the
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DoD’s role for securing the United States’ cyberspace, using the following investigative
questions:
•

What is DoD’s role for securing the United States’ homeland from cyber
attack?

•

What support can DoD provide to civil authorities to respond and recover
from cyber attack?

•

Can/should the National Guard and reserve roles be expanded to support
cyberspace roles and functions?

3.2. Department of Defense (DoD)
DoD’s role for defending the United States is two-fold: 1) Provide the military
forces to deter war; and 2) Protect the security of the United States. The literature review
in Chapter II described the national security, defense and military strategies that provide
the guidance to DoD for performing its mission. Traditionally, the DoD has achieved its
mission by force or threat of force (deterrence) and projecting its power abroad.
The DoD’s mission and functions are documented in Joint Publication 1 (JP1)
Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States and are listed below:
“As prescribed by higher authority, the DOD will maintain and employ Armed
Forces to fulfill the following aims: defend the Constitution of the United States
(U.S.) against all enemies, foreign and domestic; ensure, by timely and effective
military action, the security of the United States, its possessions and areas vital to its
interest; and uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United
States. These functions are performed under the authority, direction, and control of
the Secretary of Defense, who in turn reports to the President of the U.S., our
Commander-in-Chief” [30].
The President of the United States enforces the nation’s laws and serves as
Commander-in-Chief over the Armed Forces. The President and Secretary of Defense
(referred to as National Command Authority (NCA) [30]) exercise authority and control
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of the Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command as illustrated
in Figure 1.

Figure 1. DoD Chain of Command and Control
[30:II-5]
In Figure 1, DoD Chain of Command and Control, the primary chain of command
and control branch runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
to the Unified Commands. The Unified Commands conduct military operations (in
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peace-time and conflict) to support national objectives. There are a total of nine Unified
Commands (UCs):
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) *
United States Europe Command (USEUCOM) *
United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) *
United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) *
United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) *
United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)
The five UCs listed above with “*” following their names have geographic Areas

of Responsibility (AORs). The remaining UCs provide capabilities on a global scale or
based on function. Figure 2 depicts these AORs.

Figure 2: Combatant Commanders Geographic Areas of Responsibility (AORs)
[31]
The second chain of command and control shown in Figure 1 is administrative in
nature and is used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the
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combatant commands. This branch runs from the President through the SECDEF to the
Secretaries of the Military Departments.
The President is the ultimate authority as commander-in-chief of the armed
forces. The Secretary of Defense tasks the Military Departments, Unified Commands,
and the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff for conducting the nation’s military operations
and executing national defense strategies.
The Military Departments (Air Force, Army and Navy) operate under the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of each department. The primary
mission of the Military Departments is to organize, train and equip forces to provide
capabilities when needed in support of Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements.
The Secretaries exercise authority through their respective Service Chiefs over Service
forces not directly assigned to the Unified Commands. The Service Chiefs, except as
otherwise prescribed by law, perform their duties under the authority, direction, and
control of the Secretaries of the respective Military Departments to whom they are
directly responsible.

Service Chiefs are senior military advisers to the National

Command Authority (NCA) for matters pertaining to their respective service.
3.3. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
The Department of Homeland Security’s role is to lead the United States in
unifying internal efforts to secure the vast national network of organizations and
institutions involved in contributing to the economic well being and security of our
country. Figure 3 illustrates the DHS organization chart.
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Figure 3: DHS Org Chart
[32:1]
The DHS is responsible for protecting the nation’s “critical infrastructure” and
key resources.

The term “critical infrastructure”

is defined in the Uniting and

Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Public Law 107-56, 115 Stat.
272, dated 26 October 2001, as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital
to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would
have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health
or safety, or any combination of those matters” [33].
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There are 25 offices reporting to Secretary of Homeland Security that are
responsible for performing homeland security activities. Cyberspace security homeland
defense activities are located in the National Protection & Programs Directorate (NPPD).
The NPPD’s mission is to promote the DHS’s risk-reduction mission.
illustrates the NPPD organization chart.

Figure 4

The Infrastructure Protection office is

responsible for ensuring that the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources are
protected.

The DoD SSA for the Defense Industrial Base works with the Infrastructure

Protection Assistant Secretary under the National Protection & Programs office.

Figure 4: DHS National Protection and Programs Organization Chart
[32:11]
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3.4. Literature Review Content Analysis
This section investigates the documents described in Chapter II in more detail.
The research and investigative questions are used to guide the research.
What is DoD’s role for securing the United States’ cyberspace?
Examining the documents provided in the literature review, the research reveals
that EO 13231 provides policy for protecting the information systems of our nation’s
critical infrastructures [13].

The National Strategy for Homeland Security provides

guidance for securing the nation by integrating the capabilities of local, Tribal, State, and
Federal governments with the private and non-profit sectors, in order to secure the critical
infrastructures and key resources in the land, water, air, space, and cyber domains [15].
Securing the nation’s homeland cannot be performed by government alone.
Eight-five percent of the US infrastructure is privately owned [15]. It requires our entire
society to get involved: the American people, federal, state, and local governments, and
the private sector businesses. Homeland Security defines “State” as “any state of the
United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American
Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or the trust territory of the
Pacific Islands” and defines “local government” as “any county, city, village, town,
district, or other political subdivision of any state, any Native American tribe or
authorized tribal organization, or Alaska native village or organization, and includes any
rural community or unincorporated town or village or any other public entity for which
an application for assistance is made by a state or political subdivision thereof” [15].
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The National Strategy for Homeland Security defines the following six critical
mission areas: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic
counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure, defending against catastrophic
terrorism, and emergency preparedness and response.

The Protecting Critical

Infrastructure and Key Assets (CI/KR) critical mission area contains the Securing of
cyberspace initiative. The nation’s critical infrastructures are complex and if successfully
attacked, the effects from the attack could have far reaching damaging ripple effects
throughout the infrastructure.
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace encourages Americans to secure the
portions of cyberspace that they own, operate, control, or interact with and identified the
lead SSAs for each of the critical infrastructures. The DoD is identified as the lead SSA
for the DIB [15]. This strategy provides direction for empowering and engaging people in
protecting the cyber domain under their jurisdiction. As is the case for the homeland in
general, the government cannot defend cyberspace alone:
“The way business is transacted, government operates, and national defense is
conducted have changed. These activities now rely on an interdependent network
of information technology infrastructures called cyberspace. The National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace provides a framework for protecting this
infrastructure that is essential to our economy, security, and way of life…
Securing cyberspace is an extraordinarily difficult strategic challenge that
requires a coordinated and focused effort from our entire society—the federal
government, state and local governments, the private sector, and the American
people” [34].

Protecting the Nation’s cyberspace domain involves effort from local, Tribal,
State, and Federal governments, the private and non-profit sectors, and the American
people. Figure 5 illustrates the roles and responsibilities of the American people in
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securing cyberspace and the five national priorities for securing cyberspace. National
Priority 1 focuses on improving our ability to respond to cyber incidents and reducing the
potential damage from such incidents. National Priorities 2, 3, and 4 are aimed at
reducing the number of exploitable vulnerabilities thus preventing successful cyber
attacks, and National Priority 5 seeks to prevent cyber attacks that could affect national
security assets such as the DoD, DIB, nation’s cyberspace, and the nation’s critical
infrastructures. DoD, working with intelligence and law enforcement agencies, is tasked
to attribute cyberspace attacks to ensure timely and appropriate responses to attacks.
Roles and Responsibilities in Securing Cyberspace
National
Priority 1
National
Cyberspace
Security
Response
System

Home User/
Small
Business
Large
Enterprises
Critical
Sectors/
Infrastructures
National
Issues and
Vulnerabilties
Global

National
Priority 2
National
Cyberspace
Security Threat
and
Vulnerability
Reduction
System

National
Priority 3
National
Cyberspace
Security
Awareness and
Training
Program

National Priority
4
Securing
Governments’
Cyberspace

National
Priority 5
National
Security and
International
Cyberspace
Security
Cooperation

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

Figure 5: Cyberspace Roles and Responsibilities
[18]

The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and
Key Assets provides the guiding principles for securing the critical infrastructure and
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addresses the protection challenge for each of the sectors. Figure 6 illustrates the DoD
DIB protection challenge: ~ 250,000 firms in 215 distinct industries located worldwide.
THE PROTECTION CHALLENGE
Agriculture and Food 1,912,000 farms;
87,000 food-processing plants
Water 1,800 federal reservoirs;
1,600 municipal waste water facilities
Public Health 5,800 registered hospitals
Emergency Services 87,00 U.S. localities
Defense Industrial Base 250,000 firms in 215
distinct industries
Telecommunications 2 billion miles of cable
Energy
Electricity 2,800 power plants
Oil and Natural Gas 300,000 producing sites
Transportation
Aviation 5,000 public airports
Passenger Rail and Railroads 120,000 miles of major railroads
Highways, Trucking, and
Busing 590,000 highway bridges
Pipelines
Maritime 2 million miles of pipelines
Mass Transit 300 inland/costal ports
500 major urban public transit operators
Banking and Finance 26,600 FDIC insured institutions
Chemical Industry and 66,000 chemical plants
Hazardous Materials
Postal and Shipping 137 million delivery sites
Key Assets
National Monuments and Icons 5,800 historic buildings
Nuclear Power Plants
Dams 104 commercial nuclear power plants
Government Facilities 80,000 dams
3,000 government owned/operated facilities
Commercial Assets 460 skyscrapers
*These are approximate figures.

Figure 6: United States’ Protection Challenge
[20]
DoD cannot execute its mission without support of the Defense Industrial Base
(DIB). The DIB provides most of the equipment, materials, services, and weapons used
by DoD to perform its mission as defined by the national orders, strategies, directives and
plans.
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The National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America derives its
objectives from the NSS, NDS and the current security environment [22]. The Armed
Forces provide homeland defense by securing strategic air, land, sea, and space access
points to the United States and its territories. The Armed Forces task is to fight and win
wars, defeating a wide range of adversaries from state to non-state entities. The Armed
Forces must be prepared to address the following types of security environment
challenges: (1) Traditional: state employs recognized military capabilities; (2) Irregular:
Use of unconventional methods to counter stronger opponent; (3) Catastrophic: Use of
Weapons of Mass Destruction or producing WMD-like effects; and (4) Disruptive: Use
of technology to affect Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR): for example –
a cyberspace attack.
The National Response Plan (NRP) for responding to incidents of national
significance contains an annex for responding to cyber incidents [23]. The National
Response Plan’s Cyber Incident Annex “discusses policies, organization, actions, and
responsibilities for a coordinated, multidisciplinary, broad-based approach to prepare
for, respond to, and recover from cyber-related Incidents of National Significance
impacting critical national processes and the national economy” [35].
As stated in the NRP Cyber Incident Annex, DoD’s core roles and responsibilities
for securing the nation’s cyberspace and coordinating incident response are: 1) providing
defense support to civil authorities; 2) providing intelligence and information-sharing; 3)
assisting with law enforcement investigations; and 4) providing military operations to
defend the homeland. This annex also stated: “If authorized by applicable law and
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policy, DoD can take action to deter or defend against cyber attacks that pose a threat to
our national security” [35]. The Cyber Incident Annex was exercised in February 2006
(known as exercise Cyber Storm), with results published in August 2006. The results of
this report will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV.
In the NRP’s Cyber Incident Annex, DoD provides cyberspace support to DHS
using the Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) Computer
Emergency Response Teams (CERT) to identify, mitigate, and if necessary, respond to
cyber attacks. The U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and JTF-GNO provide
intelligence

analysis

of

cyber

attacks.

JTF-GNO

also

houses

the

Law

Enforcement/Counter Intelligence Center which brings together DoD law enforcement
and the counterintelligence organizations during a cyber incident.
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) provides the unifying structure
for integrating CI/KR protection into a single national program. The overarching goal of
the NIPP is to:
“Build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by enhancing protection of
the Nation’s CI/KR to prevent, deter, neutralize, or mitigate the effects of deliberate
efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit them; and to strengthen
national preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery in the event of an attack,
natural disaster, or other emergency” [28].

Figure 7 demonstrates the NIPP CI/KR protection methodology scheme: manage
the risks by deterring the threats, mitigating the vulnerabilities, or minimizing the
consequences associated with a terrorist attack or other incident.
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Figure 7: NIPP CI/KR Protection Methodology Model
[28]

There are seventeen critical infrastructures identified in the NIPP; all of them rely
on cyberspace to be operational. Each Sector Specific Agency (SSA) works closely with
DHS to develop Sector Specific Plans (SSPs) and with their respective sector specific
partners to develop risk management and protective programs.
Figure 8 illustrates the United States’ Critical Infrastructure / Key Resources
(CI/KR) Sectors. Looking at this breakdown of SSAs, it appears that the SSA lead
agencies are selected based on the critical infrastructure sectors that fall within their
purview.

It is up to each lead sector agency to coordinate within the sector and with

other sectors that may have overlapping areas dependent on each other. As noted earlier,
the DoD has been designated as the lead SSA for the DIB. DoD provided an annual SSP
to DHS in May 2007.
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Sector-Specific Agency (SSA)

Critical Infrastructure/Key
Resources Sector

Department of Agriculture1
Department of Health and Human Services2
Department of Defense3
Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of the Interior
Department of the Treasury
Environmental Protection Agency
Department of Homeland Security
Office of Infrastructure Protection

Agriculture and Food
Defense Industrial Base
Energy4
Public Health and Healthcare
National Monuments and Icons
Banking and Finance
Drinking Water and Water Treatment Systems

Office of Cyber Security and
Telecommunications

Chemical
Commercial Facilities
Dams
Emergency Services
Commercial Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and
Waste
Information Technology
Telecommunications

Transportation Security Administration

Postal and Shipping

Transportation Security Administration,
United States Coast Guard5

Transportation Systems6

Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Federal Protective Service

Government Facilities

1 The Department of Agriculture is responsible for agriculture and food (meat, poultry, and egg products).
2 The Department of Health and Human Services is responsible for food other than meat, poultry, and egg products.
3 Nothing in this plan impairs or otherwise affects the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the Department of
Defense (DOD), including the chain of command for military forces from the President as Commander in Chief, to
the Secretary of Defense, to the commander of military forces, or military command and control procedures.
4 The Energy Sector includes the production, refining, storage, and distribution of oil, gas, and electric power, except
for commercial nuclear power facilities.
5 The U.S. Coast Guard is the SSA for the maritime transportation mode.
6 As stated in HSPD-7, the Department of Transportation and the Department of Homeland Security will collaborate
on all matters relating to transportation security and transportation infrastructure protection.

Figure 8: United States’ Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources Sector
[28]

The Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
(CI/KR) Sector Specific Plan (SSP) provides a coordinated strategy for managing risk
within DIB critical asset locations throughout the world and describes a risk management
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approach and plan for the DIB. DoD relies on the DIB to provide the capabilities to
support and sustain DoD accomplishing its mission. The absence or unavailability of
some assets designated as critical DIB assets, and the products and services these assets
produce, could cause military mission failure. The next two tables identify the products
and services that DIB provides to DoD.
Table 2 lists the segment and sub-segment capabilities provided by the Defense
Industrial Base to DoD.

Segments

Table 2: DIB Segments and Sub-segments
[29]
Sub-segments
Segments
Sub-segments
•
•
•
•
•
•

Missile

Aircraft

Troop Support

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Space
Combat
Vehicle

Tactical Missile
Torpedo
Strategic Missile
Fixed Wing
Helicopter
Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle
Soldier Systems
Clothing & Textile
Subsistence/Medical
Smoke Obscurant
Nuclear, Biological,
Chemical Systems
Launch Vehicle
Satellite
Tracked vehicle
Tactical vehicle

Ammunition

Weapons

Information
Technology

Shipbuilding
Electronics

•
•
•
•
•
•

Bombs & Warheads
Cartridges & Fuses
Explosives
Small
Medium
Large

•
•
•
•

Command, Control,
Computers, & Intelligence
Information Security
Trainers & Simulators
Computer Peripherals

•
•
•
•
•

Surface Ship
Subsurface
Electronic Warfare
SONAR
Radar

Table 3 lists the commodities capabilities provided by the Defense Industrial Base
to DoD.
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Table 3: DIB Commodities
[29]
Mechanical
•
•
•
•

Diesel Engines
Rocket Engines
Turbine Engines
Aircraft Transmission

•
•
•
•

Automotive Transmission
Landing Gear
Bearings
Pumps & Compressors

•
•

Nuclear Components
Hydraulics

•
•

Composites
Precious Metals

•
•

Aircraft Circuit Breakers
Switch Gear

•
•
•

Traveling Wave Tubes
Circuit Boards
Software

Structural
•
•

Forgings
Castings

•
•

Depleted Uranium Armor
Ceramic Armor

Electrical
•
•

Electrical Motors
Batteries Thermal

•
•

Auxiliary Power Units
Low Smoke Wire & Cable

•
•
•

Optics
Guidance/Control
Communication

•
•
•

Digitization
GPS Receiver
Semiconductors

Electronics

As the lead SSA for the DIB, DoD’s goals for protecting the Defense Industrial
Base are: 1) Prevent/Delay an incident; 2) Detect a potential incident; 3) Mitigate/respond
to incident; 4) Recover from an incident; and 5) Develop resiliency. [29:24]
The Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
(CI/KR) Sector Specific Plan (SSP) focuses on steps to 1) Identify a critical asset list by
identifying Assets, Systems, networks and Functions; 2) Assess the risk based on
mission, human, economic and public confidence impacts, consequences, vulnerabilities,
and threats, 3) Prioritize the critical assets on that list; 4) Perform vulnerability
assessments on high-priority critical assets; and 5) Encourage contractors’ actions to
remediate or mitigate adverse effects found during these assessments, as appropriate, to
ensure continuity of business operations.

34

DoD generated the DoD Directive 3020.40 titled Defense Critical Infrastructure
Program (DCIP) [26]. DoD assigned the Defense Contract Management Agency
(DCMA) as the operational lead for the DCIP as DCMA manages government contracts
with the DIB. DoD and DCMA focused their DCIP efforts on identifying and
prioritizing assets, systems, networks, and functions that, if damaged, would result in
unacceptable consequences to the DOD mission, national economic security, public
health and safety, or public confidence.
Achieving the Mission Assurance objective (ability to mobilize, deploy and
sustain U. S. military operations) requires having the core capabilities in place so that
DoD can perform its assigned duties based on having access to the defense critical
infrastructure. The defense critical infrastructure is defined as “DoD and non-DoD cyber
and physical assets and associated infrastructure essential to project and support
military forces worldwide” [25]. Achieving the Mission Assurance objective requires
ensuring the preparedness of the Defense Industrial base (DIB) and may also require
DoD to protect DIB elements. The Defense Industrial Base is defined as “DoD, the U.S.
Government, and the private sector worldwide industrial complex with capabilities to
perform research and development (R&D), design, produce, deliver, and maintain
military weapon systems, subsystems, components, or parts to meet military
requirements” [29].
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) provided a report to Congress in
August 2007 titled “Defense Infrastructure: Management Actions Needed to Ensure
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Effectiveness of DOD’s Risk Management Approach for the Defense Industrial Base”
[36], which documented deficiencies in the DoD’s DIB Risk Management Approach.

Table 4, Summary of DoD’s Efforts in Identifying and Assessing Critical DIB
Assets, provides the metrics for the current number of important and critical DIB assets
identified and the number of contractors assessed as of 1 June 2007.
Table 4: Summary of DOD’s Efforts in Identifying and
Assessing Critical DIB Assets [36:12]
Critical Contractors
DIB Assets
Important Domestic Foreign Total
Identified
900
194
9
203
Assessed*
8
0
8
*The number of contractors assessed does not include 5 that were completed prior
to DCMA’s pilot program being established
Table 5, Assessments Planned during Fiscal years 2007 to 2012, provides the
projected metrics for performing DIB Critical Infrastructure Planning Mission Assurance
Assessments (CIP MAA) on identified DIB assets.
Table 5: Assessments Planned during Fiscal Years 2007 to 2012 [36:16]
Fiscal year
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Assessments Planned as of Nov 2006
19
50
50
50
20
20
Revised plan as of May 2007**
14
21
21
50
50
50
**DCMA is planning that after completing the initial assessments, DIB assets
would be reassessed every three years
DoD issued the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support in June 2005
and is based on the National Defense Strategy’s active layered defense concept.
“Homeland defense is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic
population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression,
or other threats as directed by the President [25]. DoD can provide civil assistance to
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local government under the Posse Comitatus Act if authorized by the National Command
Authority. The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 June 1878, limits DoD’s capabilities for
providing military assistance to domestic law enforcement. “Unless under authorization
by the President, Congress, or the Constitution, Posse Comitatus, together with related
DOD regulations, prohibits the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy from directly
participating in civilian law enforcement activities within the United States” [30]. The
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support improves the nation’s ability to
respond to threats against the nation’s homeland [25].
Figure 9 illustrates the strategy foundations for formulating DoD’s Strategy for
Homeland Defense and Civil Support.

Figure 9: Foundations for DoD Strategy for Homeland
Defense and Civil Support [25]
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The National Security Strategy and National Strategy for Homeland Security
provide guidance to the National Defense Strategy for defining its strategic objectives.
The National Defense Strategy provides the guidance to the Strategy for Homeland
Defense and Civil Support for securing the United States from direct attack.
Figure 10 illustrates DoD’s Strategic Goals, Key Objectives, and its core
capabilities for US Homeland Defense and Civil Support. DoD leads military missions to
prevent, deter, and defeat attacks on the United States. DoD, when directed by NCA,
provides defense support of civil authorities. DoD enables others by sharing capabilities
and expertise with domestic agencies and international partners.

Figure 10: DoD Objectives and Core Capabilities for
Protecting the US from Attack [25]
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The

Strategy

for

Homeland

Defense

and

Civil

Support

designates

USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, and USSTRATCOM as being responsible for defending
the nation’s homeland cyberspace infrastructure and providing civil support.
USNORTHCOM and USPACOM conduct operations for addressing threats
against the United States, their geographic AOR territories and their AORs’ interests.
They are also tasked to provide military assistance to civil authorities when directed by
the National Command Authority under the Posse Comitatus Act [37]. They will respond
to civil support incidents when the local and state support agencies are unable to deal
with the incidents [25]. The other regional combatant commanders have a lesser role in
defending the nation’s homeland cyberspace since they are responsible for maintaining
their own networks within their AOR.
USSTRATCOM’s mission objectives are: 1) Provide the nation with global
deterrence capabilities; 2) Synchronize DoD effects to combat adversary weapons of
mass destruction worldwide; 3) Enable decisive global kinetic and non-kinetic combat
effects through the application and advocacy of integrated intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR); 4) Provide space and global strike operations; 5) Information
Operations (IO); and 6) Integrated missile defense and robust command and control [38].
One of USSTRATCOM’s component commands is the Joint Task Force – Global
Network Operations (JTF-GNO) command. JTF-GNO is responsible for assuring system
and network availability, information protection, and timely information delivery using
the Global Information Grid (GIG) across the strategic, operational, and tactical
boundaries in support of DoD’s mission [39]. USSTRATCOM also contains the Joint
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Functional Component Command – Network Warfare (JFCC-NW) which “facilitates
cooperative engagement with other national entities in computer network defense and
network warfare as part of the global information operations mission.” [40]
National Guard and Reserve members can be activated to serve as regular armed
forces by presidential order under United States Code Title 10 – Armed Forces. USC
Title 10 – Armed Forces defines the United States military organization and its powers
[41]. USC Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 18 Military Support for Civilian Law
Enforcement Agencies provides the legal guidance for providing Armed Forces to assist
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.
National Guard forces can also be activated by a state governor to serve in time of
a state emergency. USC Title 32 – National Guard defines the United States National
Guard and its powers. Title 32, Chapter 9 (Homeland Defense Activities) provides the
legal guidance for providing National Guard to assist in homeland defense activities [42].
The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is using National Guard and
Reserve Forces to perform the Critical Infrastructure Protection – Mission Assurance
Assessments (CIP-MAAs) of the DIB sector for performing the DoD Directive 3020.40,
Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP).
The DoD role for securing the United States’ cyberspace is to serve as the lead
SSA for protecting the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) critical infrastructure using risk
management methodology.

DoD provides homeland defense and civil support if

authorized by the National Command Authority (NCA). DoD responds to cyber attacks
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in coordination with DHS and other agencies if the cyber attacks are deemed of national
significance and authorized by law and policy.
When reviewing DoD as a role model for DIB cyber security practices, one has
only to read the latest news reports to determine that DoD has its own problems in
securing its infrastructure from cyberspace attacks. Andrew Palowitch, a former CIA
official and industry consultant to the USSTRATCOM Commander stated, “America is
under widespread attack in cyberspace,” and cited “statistics that there were 37,000
reported breaches of government and private systems in fiscal 2007. There were nearly
13,000 direct assaults on federal agencies then, and 80,000 attempted computer network
attacks on Defense Department systems … Some of those assaults reduced the U.S.,
military operational capabilities” [43].
In The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, President Bush
reflected that “This strategy reflects our most solemn obligation: to protect the security
of the American people” [27]. This strategy is based on two pillars. The first pillar
promotes freedom, democracy, justice, human dignity, and prosperity through free and
fair trade. The second pillar is confronting the challenges of our time by leading worldwide efforts to address the challenges. The challenges of our time include addressing
disruptive security environment challenges where technology is used to affect our
nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR). DoD’s goals for defending the
DIB critical infrastructure include addressing the disruptive security environment
challenges.

41

3.5. Investigative Questions
Now that the research has reviewed the literature from Chapter II and answered
the research question, the research moves to the investigative questions and answers them
with the gained knowledge from reviewing the literature and answering the research
question.
What is DoD’s role for securing the United States homeland critical infrastructure
from cyber attack?
In the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, DoD is identified as the lead
Sector Specific Agency for the securing the United States cyberspace for the Defense
Industrial Base critical infrastructure.
In the National Response Plan’s Cyber Incident Annex, DoD entities responsible
for computer security and computer network defense may provide defense support of
civil authorities, provide information sharing and intelligence, assist in law-enforcement
investigations, and provide military operations to defend the homeland. DoD can take
action to deter or defend against cyber attacks that pose a threat to our national security,
if authorized by the applicable law and policy [35]. All cyber attacks against the nation’s
critical infrastructures/key resources that have national significance, affect the national
security of the American people, and NCA authority to respond, can cause DoD to
engage. The nation’s cyberspace is under attacks around the clock, but these attacks
typically do not require DoD intervention.
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One type of cyber attack could include obvious attempts to affect the well-being
of the United States in cyberspace. It could be as devastating as producing major
electrical outages with cascading effects preventing people from purchasing the basic
necessities (food & water) to lack of communications to American people. Major
electrical outages could create chaos, and DoD could be called upon to assist in providing
civil support to local law enforcement agencies. Additionally, DoD could assist in
determining attribution for the attack, and if ordered by the National Command
Authority, could take action against the United States space cyber attacker. Effects from
this type of United States cyberspace attack could ripple to the Defense Industrial Base,
preventing it from providing capabilities to DoD consisting of: missiles, aircraft, troop
support, space capabilities, combat vehicles, ammunition, weapons, information
technology, shipbuilding, electronics, and mechanical, structural, electrical, and
electronic parts. By not having these capabilities provided by the Defense Industrial
Base, DoD cannot achieve its mission. These capabilities provide DoD with the products
and services necessary to equip, inform, mobilize, deploy, and sustain operations
worldwide.
When the terrorist physical attacks on the United States occurred on 11 September
2001 (9/11), it was nationally devastating. In addition to the physical destruction, there
was a severe psychological impact. People wanted to know how this could happen to our
great country. Our nation’s people experienced a great deal of concern over just being
able to get food, water and purchasing of fuel for their vehicles. Rumors were being
passed around that our water supplies and oil refineries were going to be attacked. The
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airline industry was in shock. The New York Stock Exchange was non-operational for
approximately one week, affecting our nation’s prosperity and economic well-being.
People were afraid to attend major events that may be targeted by terrorists. The DoD
provided civil support and military support for homeland defense during the aftermath of
the 9/11 incident. This attack forced the nation to look at its own infrastructures and
identify those critical infrastructures that were critical to the nation’s well-being. The
DIB was identified as a critical infrastructure and DoD was assigned to protect it as the
lead SSA.
What support can DoD provide to Civil Authorities to respond and recover from
cyber attack?
In the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, DoD, law enforcement agencies,
and the Intelligence Community (IC) are tasked with improving the attack prevention and
attack attribution capabilities. In the National Response Plan’s Cyber Incident Annex,
DoD can take action to deter or defend against cyber attacks that pose a threat to our
national security, if authorized by the applicable law and policy [35]. DoD was
designated as the lead agency for the Defense Industrial Base. DoD works with over
250,000 firms in 215 distinct industries located worldwide to protect the Defense
Industrial Base (DIB). DoD supports the DIB in reducing risks from cyber attacks or
hazards by using these goals as their guideline: 1) Preventing/Delaying an incident; 2)
Detecting a potential incident; 3) Mitigating/Responding to incident; 4) Recovering from
Incident; and 5) Developing resiliency. The USNORTHCOM and USPACOM can
provide the appropriate DoD personnel to assist civil authorities in addressing the cyber
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attacks. The DIB critical infrastructures are responsible for their own recovery using
Contingency Plans, Continuity of Operations, and relying on Backups.
Can/Should the National Guard and reserve members’ roles be expanded to support
cyberspace roles and functions?
The National Guard and reserve members can be used and are being used by DoD
in supporting DoD’s role as the lead sector-specific agency (SSA) for the Defense
Industrial Base Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource (CI/KR). National Guard
personnel are providing Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Mission Assurance
Assessment (MAA) training for individuals who perform DIB assessments. National
Guard personnel are also performing the CIP-MAA at various DIB sites [44].
3.6. Summary
This chapter presented the methodologies used in the research to perform
literature review and content analysis of literature relevant to this research.
Cyberspace has existed in our work environments for over fifty years, however,
only through technological advances have we been able to integrate cyberspace into our
daily lives. The last twenty years have seen the release of the first piece of malware
software in 1988 known as the internet worm (which was fairly harmless) to more recent
events of cyber attacks being committed on the country of Estonia [45].
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Protecting the Nation’s cyberspace domain involves effort from local, Tribal,
State, and Federal governments, the private and non-profit sectors, and the American
people.
“And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you--ask
what you can do for your country.”
(Source: Inaugural Address of President John F. Kennedy)
John F. Kennedy spoke the above words during his inaugural speech on 20
January 1961 [46]. These words apply almost fifty years later to our effort to defend and
protect US cyberspace critical infrastructure. Americans can take these words to heart
and do their part in securing cyberspace (keeping their systems patched and virus
signatures up to date are just a few ways). We must all do our part to keep America’s
cyberspace safe.
DoD’s role in defending the United States’ cyberspace is diversified by serving as
the lead sector-specific agency (SSA) for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). The DIB
consists of over 250,000 firms for 215 unique industries required to support the DoD in
accomplishing its mission. As the lead SSA for the DIB, DoD works with the DIB in
performing risk management.
In Chapter IV, the research examines the results of the literature review and
contents analysis and looks more closely at some of the results the review provided. In
particular, the research is looking more closely at the GAO Audit report of DoD and the
DIB and the Cyber Storm exercise results.
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IV. Results and Analysis
4.1. Chapter Overview
Chapter III reviewed and analyzed the literature focusing on the research and
investigative questions. It also introduced two additional documents generated by GAO
and the DHS for providing insight into how DoD is performing in securing the DIB
critical infrastructure cyberspace and for detailing the Cyber Storm Exercise performed
by DHS with its critical infrastructure lead SSAs, private sector representatives,
emergency responders, and some of our nation’s international partners.
In this chapter, the research examines the recommendations and findings in the
GAO report titled: “Defense Infrastructure: Management Actions Needed to Ensure
Effectiveness of DoD’s Risk Management Approach for the Defense Industrial Base”,
published August 2007 and in the DHS Cyber Storm exercise report, published
September 2006. The research analyzes the findings and makes observations. The
research then summarizes the findings at the end of this chapter.
4.2. GAO report on DOD Risk Management Approach for DIB Analysis
The GAO report titled: “Defense Infrastructure: Management Actions Needed to
Ensure Effectiveness of DoD’s Risk Management Approach for the Defense Industrial
Base” identified the following summarized findings [36:26]:
•

DOD is not including the military services’ listings of assets whose damage,
degradation, or destruction would result in DOD-wide mission failure

•

DoD cannot be sure it has identified the most important and critical assets, as
called for in the National Military Strategy. This finding is based on how the
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weighting factors were selected and data determined according to subjective
decisions and limited review, and that needed contractor-specific data were
lacking, as was comprehensive threat information, thus undermining the
utility of the index score for prioritizing contractors.
•

Scheduling and conducting assessments of critical DIB assets without regard
for assets’ priority rankings

•

DoD lacks a plan for working with the Department of State and other
appropriate agencies to identify and address potential challenges in assessing
vulnerabilities in foreign critical DIB assets

DoD’s challenge for the Defense Industrial Base is to prioritize DIB assets based
on criticality and put processes in place to protect its cyberspace infrastructure [47].
Cyberspace is vulnerable to attacks by anyone having access to a computer with network
connectivity using tools available for free on the internet [48]. To prevent successful
cyberspace attacks, one must implement cyber security layers in place to protect the data
and maintain information superiority. Cyber security layers include protecting the
confidentiality, integrity, and the availability (CIA) of information, authentication,
implementing access controls and monitoring, auditing and logging of security events,
implementing intrusion detection and virus scanning systems, and maintaining system
backups critical data. The CIA Triad is only good if all three legs are secure. If any of
the legs fail, then the information owner is susceptible to cyberspace attacks. In order to
maintain Information superiority, one must be able to maintain three CIA Triad legs [49].
Sophisticated attackers can intercept information, change the content, and pass the
modified information off as being authentic, affecting the integrity leg of the CIA Triad.
Sophisticated attackers can monitor information being passed in clear text and gather
information about its target, breaking the CIA Triad leg for confidentiality. Sophisticated
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attackers can perform distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks, flooding a target’s
systems with meaningless message traffic and making the target’s systems unavailable,
affecting the availability leg of the CIA Triad. The methods listed above are just a few
examples of how the CIA Triad can be broken.
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace assigned DoD’s role for defending
the United States’ cyberspace to serve as the lead Sector Specific Agency (SSA) for
protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure asset’s Defense Industrial Base [18]. DoD
published the DoD Directive 3020.40 (DoD, 2005) [27] incorporating the President’s
guidance issued in Homeland Security Presidential Directive #7 (HSPD-7) [22] to serve
as the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) for the Defense Industrial Base. DoD Directive
3020.40 states the following:
•
•
•

Collaborate with all relevant Federal departments and agencies, State and
local governments, and the private sector, including with key persons and
entities in their infrastructure sector.
Conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sector.
Encourage risk management strategies to protect against and mitigate the
effects of attacks against critical infrastructure and key resources.

An old proverb states that “a chain is only as strong as its weakest link”. In this
sense, the “chain” terminology is used to represent the nation’s cyberspace critical
infrastructures. The Defense Industrial Base consists of over 250,000 firms spread over
215 unique industries around the world. Cyber infrastructure security is typically left up
to the private sector, with voluntary participation in vulnerability assessments [50].
DIB companies want to be competitive in the market, sometimes taking shortcuts
to get a product or service to the market before their competitor beats them out. All of
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this is done at what cost? Typically, cyber security is added as an after-thought unless
the contract specifically states cyber security is required. Companies have contractual
and legal obligations to its customers, its shareholders, and to its governing body. In the
midst of delivering products and services on-time and within budget, and following all
mandated laws and guidelines, it is easy to forget about the non-mandated efforts, such as
voluntary assessments of critical infrastructures. Program managers juggle schedules all
the time and experience information overload trying to get the products and services
delivered on time and within budget.
Sixty years ago, Dr. Norbert Weiner published the paper “Cybernetics: or Control
and Communication in the Animal and the Machine” [51] in October 1948, and was
considered by the American Scientist magazine at the turn of the century among the most
“memorable and influential” works of the twentieth century. He authored this paper after
working for the United States on developing an automated anti-aircraft system for the
United States, developing communications theory, leading to the development of the term
“cybernetics”. Dr. Wiener defined cybernetics as "the science of control and
communication in the animal and the machine”. In his paper, he predicted “information
overload” conditions caused by an excess amount of traffic [52]. 60 years later, we are
still concerned with “information overload” conditions. Information overload can
prevent individuals from making good decisions and from maintaining information
superiority. Performing Risk Management with the DIB provides information overload
conditions for the DCMA and assessment teams as the DIB consists of more than
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215,000 companies scattered around the world, with DIB members having unique
characteristics.
4.3.

DHS Cyber Storm Exercise Analysis
Homeland Security Presidential Directive #5 (HSPD-5) [17] directed the creation

of the National Response Plan (NRP) [23] to establish the framework for the United
States to manage domestic incidents. The NRP’s objective is to improve coordination
among Federal, State, Local and tribal organizations for saving lives and protecting the
nation.
The NRP contains the Cyber Incident Annex that is executed when a cyber attack
occurs against the United States’ national infrastructure that could threaten the lives,
property, the nation’s economy or national security [35]. The NRP Cyber Incident
Annex states the following DoD roles and responsibilities for securing cyberspace and
coordinating incident responses: 1) Defense Support of Civil Authorities; 2) intelligence
and information-sharing; 3) law enforcement investigations; and 4) military operations to
defend the homeland. If authorized by applicable law and policy, DOD can take action to
deter or defend against cyber attacks which pose an imminent threat to national security.
The Department of Homeland Security’ (DHS) National Cyber Security Division
(NCSD) executed the NRP’s first Cyber Incident Annex on 6-10 February 2006 and
published its findings on 12 September 2006 [53]. This exercise was titled Cyber Storm
and included over 100 public and private agencies, associations, and corporations from
over 60 locations and 5 countries, over 30 private sector corporations, along with
designated Federal and State governments.
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The Cyber Storm exercise simulated a large-scale cyber attack affecting multiple
critical infrastructures within the Energy, IT, Transportation, and Telecommunications
sectors. There were 8 significant findings resulting from the exercise:
•

Interagency coordination needed to be refined such that the cyber
community better understood when to activate federal engagement

•

Contingency Planning, Risk Assessment, and Roles and Responsibilities
needed to be solidified

•

Correlation of Multiple Incidents Between Public and Private Sectors
remained a challenge

•

Training and Exercise Program needed to be established and executed to
ensure everyone knew the roles, policies, and procedures

•

Coordination Between Entities of Cyber Incidents was challenged as the
number of incidents increased

•

Common Framework for Response and Information Access strengthened
information sharing between domestic and international cyber response
communities

•

Strategic Communications and Public Relations Plan must be part of the
collaborated contingency plan

•

Improvement of Processes, Tools, and Technology required to enhance the
quality, speed and coordination of response

DHS, NCSD, and exercise participants incorporated lessons learned from the
Cyber Storm 2006 exercise findings. Plans are in place for the next exercise titled Cyber
Storm II to occur in March 2008 [54]. It will be interesting to see the results of this next
exercise.
It is not clear from analyzing the report findings if the cyber exercise progressed
to the point of authorizing by applicable law and policy DoD to take action to deter or
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defend against the cyber attacks which posed an imminent threat to national security. If
this happened, it was not detailed in the findings. It is critical to detail the procedure for
determining when to engage DoD to deter or defend against cyber attacks which pose an
imminent threat to national security, and the unity of command for performing this.
The type of Cyber attack that will impact DoD can be compared to results of the
September 11, 2001 physical attack on the United States’ homeland which shut down all
air and train transportation until security procedures could be put in place to monitor
passengers, shut down the New York Stock Exchange for approximately five business
days, and greatly impacted the Manhattan’s business district [55].
It can also be compared to the effects of the natural disaster Hurricane Katrina in
August 2005 which affected the United States’ Gulf coast states and rippled throughout
the country causing gas prices to go up, among other things. The government was not at
its best performance when the “failure to initiate” occurred for Hurricane Katrina causing
lives to be lost, failures in communications and the lack of following procedures to get
the assistance from the federal government that the gulf coast states needed. The gulf
coast states are still reeling (over two years later) from the effects of the hurricane, but
are slowly coming back to life [56]
DoD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (SHDCS) provides the
guidance for DoD in performing Homeland Defense and Civil Support [25]. The
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense is in charge of DoD’s homeland
defense activities. US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is responsible for
planning, organizing, and executing homeland defense and civil support missions within
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the continental United States, Alaska, and territorial waters. US Pacific Command
(USPACOM) has homeland defense and civil support responsibilities for Hawaii and US
territories, possessions and freely associated states.
If directed by the President or the SECDEF of the United States, DoD can provide
assistance to local law enforcement agencies, provide intelligence and informationsharing to assist in characterizing the cyber attack and attributing the attack to an entity,
assist in law enforcement operations, and perform military operations to defend the
homeland. DoD can take actions to deter or defend against cyber attacks which pose an
imminent threat to national security based on applicable laws and policies.
The National Guard’s role in providing cyber support to Civil Authorities consists
of supporting DoD’s Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) role for performing CIP
Mission Assurance Assessments (MAA) on the Defense Industrial base (DIB)
components [57]. The DoD DCIP has collaborated with the National Guard Bureau, the
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), the West Virginia National Guard, the
Naval Surface Warfare Center‘s (NSWC) Mission Assurance Division to develop CIPMAA curriculum for training DIB assessment personnel. The DIB is cooperating with
the National Guard members for assessing their operations.
4.4.

Summary
DoD’s role in defending the United States’ cyberspace is diversified by serving as

the lead sector-specific agency (SSA) for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). The DIB
consists of over 250,000 firms for 215 unique industries required to support the DoD in
accomplishing its mission. GAO published findings of its assessment for DoD in
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performing risk management of the DIB and DHS published findings from its cyber
exercise.

It is clear from reviewing these findings that there is still much work to be

done by DoD in securing the nation’s critical infrastructures.
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V. Conclusion
5.1.

Discussion
The DoD role for securing the United States cyberspace is serving as the lead

Sector Specific Agency (SSA) for protecting the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) critical
infrastructure’s cyberspace. DoD can provide homeland defense and civil support if
directed by National Command Authority, and can respond to cyber attacks of national
significance if authorized to do so, coordinating response with DHS and other agencies.
DoD can encourage and sometimes mandate to the DIB sector (based on the national
security level of the DIB’s role) best practices in cyber security. However, DoD cannot
defend DIB’s cyberspace on its own. Each of the DIB partners must take an active role
in securing its own cyberspace.
Potential adversaries are aware that the United States’ relies heavily on the
cyberspace infrastructure to perform its DoD mission at home and abroad [58]. These
adversaries are studying the types of cyberspace information systems and vulnerabilities
associated with them that are being used by the US. United States’ cyberspace is under
constant surveillance, with malicious actors hoping to find weaknesses that can be
exploited for gaining information superiority over our nation.
The DoD published DoD Directive 3020.40 (DoD, 2005) [26] incorporating the
President’s guidance issued in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7)
[21] to serve as the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) for the Defense Industrial Base.
The Directive states that DoD will do the following:
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•
•
•

Collaborate with all relevant Federal departments and agencies, State and
local governments, and the private sector, including with key persons and
entities in their infrastructure sector.
Conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sector.
Encourage risk management strategies to protect against and mitigate the
effects of attacks against critical infrastructure and key resources.

An old proverb states that “a chain is only as strong as its weakest link”. In this
sense, the “chain” terminology represents the nation’s cyberspace critical infrastructure.
The Defense Industrial Base consists of over 215,000 firms spread over 250 unique
industries around the world. Cyber infrastructure security is typically left up to the
private sector, with voluntary participation in vulnerability assessments [59].
System administrators, engineers, and programmers need to be responsible for
assessing and mitigating the risks, and performing their roles responsibly and ensuring
the CIA Triad is not broken [60]. Multi-layered cyber security mechanisms need to be in
place so that if an adversary is able to penetrate one layer, the next layer may be the one
to stop or delay the penetration. DIB partners need to ensure that cyber security is one of
the top-funded IT items. IT professionals must keep their skills current with the
technology [61]. Companies must provide the necessary finances for appropriate cyber
security investments, including the training and certification of their IT staff.
If the United States’ cyberspace were to come under attack, there is legal
guidance [62] available for addressing the cyberspace attack. The Law of Information
Conflict (LOIC) is the “composite of the peacetime regime of international law, the law
of conflict management, and the law of armed conflict that regulates the conduct of all
state activities in cyberspace” [63]. The LOIC documents the legal options available for
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responding to the cyberspace attack based on the severity of the attack [64]. In the
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, DoD is designated as the lead sector-specific
agency for protecting the Defense Industrial Base critical infrastructure. DoD
experiences daily attacks on its own networks, yet does not resort to mounting counter
attacks.
The National Security Agency and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
in support of the President's National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, February 2003,
jointly sponsor the Centers of Academic Excellence program. This program promotes
higher Information Assurance education with the intent to grow a group of skilled
professionals who can assist in addressing vulnerabilities in our nation’s critical
cyberspace infrastructure.
At this point in time, it is still being discussed as to what actions DoD should take
to respond to a cyber attack on the nation’s critical infrastructures. The Homeland
Security Law Handbook discusses the conditions and steps involved for responding to
cyberspace attacks on the nation’s infrastructure. It is important to get these concepts
documented clearly in DoD policy and doctrine, so that if and when a cyber attack does
occur, DoD personnel will have the guidance necessary to respond strategically,
tactically, and operationally. The National Military Strategy for Cyber Operations has
been developed and is classified.
The DoD needs to continue working with the technology producers (hardware and
software) for developing cyber security products that are the backbone of our nation’s
infrastructure [65]. DoD’s role for protecting and defending the nation’s Defense
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Industrial Base critical infrastructure is complicated as the majority of the DIB is owned
by the public sector, and is scattered around the world. The technology producers need to
be aware that their responsible development and implementation of systems could be the
difference between life and death for our DoD forces [60].
Holding the DIB accountable for developing and incorporating cyber security into
those systems being used by DoD to accomplish its mission is not yet realized. The DIB
is contractually held accountable for delivering products and services as written into the
contracts. If cyber security is not written into the contract, then the nation cannot hold
the DIB members accountable when the service or product has vulnerabilities able to be
exploited by an adversary, thus increasing an adversary’s information superiority over the
United States.
5.2.

Recommendations for Future Research
There are several areas for research that can assist the United States in securing its

cyberspace: (1) Attributing cyberspace entity presence to physical location; and (2)
Mandatory DIB critical infrastructure protection participation.
The first area of recommended future research discusses developing technology to
attribute a user or adversary to a specific geo-physical location. Dr. Dorothy Denning
and Professor Peter MacDoran discussed improving computer and network security by
using a new form of location-based authentication which has the effect of grounding
cyberspace to a physical location thereby helping to attribute attacks to a geo-physical
location [66]. This geo-location-based authentication system would enforce
authentication based on authorized physical location of individual, much like the concept
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of calling from your home phone to activate a new credit card: the home phone number
has to match the information in the company’s database. This type of authentication
system would provide the capability to track a user to a physical location.
The second area of recommended future research would encourage the Defense
Contract Management Agency to add language to its contracts regarding cyber security of
the products or services being delivered. The Defense Contract Management Agency
(DCMA) is designated by DoD as the defense industrial base sector lead agent. DCMA
performs worldwide acquisition life cycle contract management for Department of
Defense weapon system programs, spares, supplies and services. This includes ensuring
on-time delivery, at the right cost and in accordance with performance standards
prescribed in over 360,000 contracts valued at over $900 billion with over 25,000
domestic and foreign contractors. DCMA information located on the DCMA website
(www.dcma.mil) does not indicate they have updated the contractual language to reflect
DCIP vulnerability assessments are required for DIB members doing business with the
government or that cyber security needs to be implemented within the company and its
services or products [67]. It appears that vulnerability assessments are purely voluntary.
This is an area that should require vulnerability assessments and contractual language
requiring cyber security be built into the company’s IT systems, applicable products and
services. On the flip side of the coin, it is in a DIB’s best interests to be the company that
implements cyber security into its services and products. No company wants to be the
one with the headlines blaring “Company loses corporate and personal information to
hacker, losses are estimated to be in millions” or “Company’s IT system failure causes
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loss of life on war field”. Imagine the confidence level of the stockholders when that
happens, affecting directly the economic well-being of the company.
5.3.

Conclusion
DoD’s role for securing United States cyberspace is to serve as the lead Sector

Specific Agency (SSA) for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). The DIB provides DoD
with the capabilities (missiles, aircraft, troop support, space, combat vehicles,
ammunition,

weapons,

information

technology,

shipbuilding,

electronics,

and

mechanical, structural, electrical, and electronic parts) to perform its mission. These
capabilities provide DoD with the products and services necessary to equip, inform,
mobilize, deploy, and sustain operations worldwide. DoD relies on the DIB to meet
requirements to fulfill the National Military Strategy.
It is voluntary for the DIB to work with DoD in performing critical infrastructure
protection mission assurance assessments (CIP-MAA). The DIB is not obligated to
comply with the CIP-MAA. DoD can make the DIB aware of potential threats, but it is
up to the DIB to manage the risks by deterring the threats, mitigating the vulnerabilities,
and minimizing the consequences. A risk assumed by one is a risk assumed by all.
If directed by the President or the SecDef of the United States, DoD can provide
assistance to local law enforcement agencies, provide intelligence and informationsharing to assist in characterizing the cyber attack and attributing the attack to an entity,
assist in law enforcement operations, and perform military operations to defend the
homeland. DoD can take actions to deter or defend against cyber attacks which pose an
imminent threat to national security based on applicable laws and policies.
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DoD’s challenge for securing the Defense Industrial Base critical infrastructure is
to put processes in place to protect its cyberspace infrastructure by identifying and
prioritizing critical assets and performing risk management [68]. Cyber security is all
about the people, the processes, and the technology. Educating our people (users,
managers, technicians, engineers, scientists, programmers) in their associated disciplines,
improving on the processes for maintaining a secure cyberspace infrastructure, and
improving the technology (building cyber security into hardware and software) contribute
to improving cyberspace security. Cyberspace security cannot be achieved without all
three of these factors (people, processes, and technology) taken into consideration.
Information superiority cannot be achieved without cyber security.
The threats still exist for an adversary to physically attack the United States, but a
skilled cyberspace adversary could strike at the heart of America’s homeland with little
cost, without ever leaving the comforts of home and retain anonymity. Our reliance on
the power and capabilities of these ITs, which may contain vulnerabilities exploitable by
an adversary, could ultimately be our weakness, our Achilles Heel.
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Appendix A. Acronym List

9/11

11 September 2001

ASD

Assistant Secretary of Defense

CCDR

Combatant Commander

CIA

Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability

CI/KR

Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources

CJCS

Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff

CIP

Critical Infrastructure Protection

DCIP

Defense Critical Infrastructure Program

DCMA

Defense Contract Management Agency

DDOS

Distributed Denial of Service

DHS

Department of Homeland Security

DIB

Defense Industrial Base

DIME

Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic

DII

Defense Information Infrastructure

DoD

Department of Defense

EO

Executive Order

F2T2EA

Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess

GAO

Government Accountability Office

GIG

Global Information Grid

HSPD

Homeland Security Presidential Directive

IP

Internet Protocol
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IS

Information Systems

IT

Information Technology

JCS

Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFCC-NW

Joint Functional Component Command – Network Warfare

JTF-GNO

Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations

MAA

Mission Assurance Assessment

NCA

National Command Authority

NDS

National Defense Strategy

NII

National Information Infrastructure

NIPP

National Infrastructure Protection Plan

NIST

National Institute of Standards and Technology

NMS

National Military Strategy

NMS-CO

National Military Strategy for Cyber Operations

NORAD

North American Aerospace Defense

NPPD

National Protection and Programs Directorate

NRP

National Response Plan

NSA

National Security Agency

NSPD

National Security Presidential Directive

NSS

National Security Strategy

OBE

Overcome By Events

OODA

Observe, Orient, Decide, Act

OSD

Office of Secretary of Defense

SECDEF

Secretary of Defense
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SSA

Sector Specific Agency

SSP

Sector Specific Plan

UC

Unified Command

U.S.

United States

US

United States

USC

United States Code

USCENTCOM

United States Central Command

USEUCOM

United States Europe Command

USJFCOM

United States Joint Forces Command

USNORTHCOM

United States Northern Command

USPACOM

United States Pacific Command

USSOCOM

United States Special Operations Command

USSOUTHCOM

United States South Command

USSTRATCOM

United States Strategic Command

USTRANSCOM

United States Transportation Command

VOIP

Voice Over Internet Protocol

65

Appendix B. Terms and Definitions
Achilles Heel - a fatal weakness that leads or may lead to a downfall. (Cyber Warfare and
Cyber Terrorism, pg 33).
Asset (Infrastructure) - A distinguishable network entity that provides a service or
capability. Assets are people, physical entities, or information located either within or
outside the United States and owned or operated by domestic, foreign, public, or private
sector organizations. (DoDD 3020.40)
Botnet - A network of remote-controlled zombie computers. Using Trojan Horse
programs or worms/viruses, a person (often called a "botmaster" or "herder") can inject
malware into a user's computer which opens a port to listen for commands; often via an
internet relay chat (IRC) channel. When the commands are received then the zombie
computer (as they are called) executes its instructions which often involve sending out
massive amounts of spam, copies of other malware, or popup advertising. The user of the
zombie may not even be aware this is happening unless they notice a slowdown of their
computer or a large amount of Internet activity. (Computer Knowledge)
Characterization (Infrastructure) - The analytic decomposition of functions, systems,
assets, and dependencies as they relate to supporting DoD operational capabilities and
assets. (DoDD 3020.40)
CIA Triad – An information security model that requires that these three key principles
be implemented to secure systems: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
Confidentiality prevents unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information. Integrity
ensures that data is an accurate and unchanged representation of the original secured
information. Availability is having reliable and timely access to the data and resources
you are authorized to use. (CISSP)
Critical Asset - A specific entity that is of such extraordinary importance that its
incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability
of a nation to continue to function effectively. (JP3-07.2)
Critical Infrastructure – Assets, systems and networks, whether physical or virtual, so
vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such assets, systems, or
networks would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security,
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. (NIPP)
Critical Infrastructure Protection - Actions taken to prevent, remediate, or mitigate the
risks resulting from vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure assets. Depending on the risk,
these actions could include: changes in tactics, techniques, or procedures; adding
redundancy; selection of another asset; isolation or hardening; guarding, etc. (JP3-28)
Cybersecurity – See Information Security.
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Cyberspace – a domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic
spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated
infrastructures. (NMS-CO)
Cyberspace - the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and
includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded
processors and controllers in critical industries. (NSPD-54/HSPD-23)
Cyber Storm Exercise - The National Cyber Exercise (NCE) Cyber Storm was executed
successfully on February 6–10, 2006. The United States (U.S.) Department of Homeland
Security (DHS)/National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) was responsible for
developing, implementing, and coordinating all aspects of Cyber Storm. The first
Government-led, full-scale, cyber security exercise of its kind, Cyber Storm was a
coordinated effort between international, Federal and State governments, and private
sector organizations to exercise their response, coordination, and recovery mechanisms in
reaction to simulated cyber events. Cyber Storm provided participants with a controlled
environment in which to exercise a coordinated cyber incident response, including
information sharing mechanisms, procedures for establishing situational awareness,
public and private organizational decision making, and public communications during a
cyber-related Incident of National Significance. Over 100 public and private agencies,
associations, and corporations participated in the exercise from over 60 locations and 5
countries. They collaborated in crisis response at operational, policy and public affairs
levels in this federally funded and congressionally mandated emergency response
exercise. The exercise included participation of more than 30 private sector corporations
and associations in its planning, execution, and after action analysis. The exercise
scenario simulated a large-scale cyber campaign affecting or disrupting multiple critical
infrastructure elements primarily within the Energy, Information Technology,
Transportation, and Telecommunications Sectors. The exercise was conducted primarily
on a separate exercise network without impacting real world information systems. (DHS
Cyber Storm Exercise Report – September 2006)
Defense Critical Asset - An asset of such extraordinary importance to DoD operations in
peace, crisis, and war that its incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious,
debilitating effect on the ability of the Department of Defense to fulfill its missions.
(DoDD 3020.40)
Defense Critical Infrastructure - DoD and non-DoD cyber and physical assets and
associated infrastructure essential to project and support military forces worldwide.
(DoDD 3020.40)
Defense Critical Infrastructure - the DOD and non-DOD networked assets essential to
project, support, and sustain military forces and operations worldwide. Assets are people,
physical entities, or information. Physical assets would include installations, facilities,
ports, bridges, power stations, telecommunication lines, pipelines, etc. The increasing
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interconnectivity and interdependence among commercial and defense infrastructures
demand that DOD take steps to understand and remedy or mitigate the vulnerabilities of,
and threats to, the critical infrastructures on which it depends for mission
accomplishment. (JP3-27)
Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) - A DoD risk management program that
seeks to ensure the availability of networked assets critical to DoD missions. Activities
include the identification, assessment, and security enhancement of assets essential for
executing the National Military Strategy. (DoDD 3020.40)
Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) - The DCIP is a fully integrated program
that provides a comprehensive process for understanding and protecting selected
infrastructure assets that are critical to national security during peace, crisis, and war. It
involves identifying, prioritizing, assessing, protecting, monitoring, and assuring the
reliability and availability of mission-critical infrastructures essential to the execution of
the NMS. The program also addresses the operational decision support necessary for
CCDRs to achieve their mission objectives despite the degradation or absence of these
infrastructures. (JP3-27)
Defense Industrial Base (DIB) - The Department of Defense, government, and private
sector worldwide industrial complex with capabilities to perform research and
development, design, produce, and maintain military weapon systems, subsystems,
components, or parts to meet military requirements. (JP 3-27)
Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Defense Sector - The Department of Defense, the U.S.
Government, and private sector worldwide industrial complex with capabilities to
perform research and development, design, produce, and maintain military weapon
systems, subsystems, components, or parts to meet military requirements. (DIB-SSP)
Defense Information Infrastructure - The shared or interconnected system of computers,
communications, data applications, security, people, training, and other support structures
serving Department of Defense (DOD) local, national, and worldwide information needs.
The defense information infrastructure connects DOD mission support, command and
control, and intelligence computers through voice, telecom-munications, imagery, video,
and multimedia services. It provides information processing and services to subscribers
over the Defense Information Systems Network and includes command and control,
tactical, intelligence, and commercial communications systems used to transmit DOD
information. Also called DII. (JP 3-13)
Defense Information Systems Network - Integrated network, centrally managed and
configured to provide long-haul information transfer services for all Department of
Defense activities. It is an information transfer utility designed to provide dedicated
point-to-point, switched voice and data, imagery, and video teleconferencing services.
Also called DISN. (JP 2-01)
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Defense Sector - A virtual association within the DCIP that traverses normal
organizational boundaries, encompasses defense networks, assets, and associated
dependencies,that perform similar functions within the Department of Defense and are
essential to the execution of the National Military Strategy. (DoDD 3020.40)
Defense Support of Civil Authorities — Civil support provided under the auspices of the
National Response Plan. Also called DSCA. (JP 3-28)
Defense support of civil authorities – often referred to as civil support, is DoD support,
including Federal military forces, the Department’s career civilian and contractor
personnel, and DoD agency and component assets, for domestic emergencies and for
designated law enforcement and other activities. The Department of Defense provides
defense support of civil authorities when directed to do so by the President or Secretary
of Defense. (DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support)
Department of Defense components - The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant
commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the
Department of Defense agencies, field activities, and all other organizational entities in
the Department of Defense. (JP 1)
Dependency - A relationship or connection whereby one entity is influenced or controlled
by another entity. (Dodd 3020.40)
Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) - Areas of national power that
are leveraged in "effects-based" operations against an adversary's vulnerabilities
identified by Operational Net Assessment, and targeted against his will and capability to
conduct war. (USJFCOM Glossary)
Distributed Denial of Service - An attack sent by an individual or individuals which can
be set up to be sent automatically by programs known as Zombies that may have been
installed in various computers in advance of the attack. With Zombies, all the attacker
need do is send a single command and they perform the attack. This method can more
easily isolate the attacker from those who might want to find him/her as the attack itself is
coming from completely unrelated computers that may be half a world away. These
DDoS attacks may even use your computer through a zombie installed by a worm.
(Computer Knowledge)
Electromagnetic Spectrum - The range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from
zero to infinity. It is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands. (JP1-02)
Emergency Response Providers - includes Federal, State, and local emergency public
safety, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical (including hospital
emergency facilities), and related personnel, agencies, and authorities.
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Financial Services Defense Sector - The DoD, government, and private sector worldwide
network and its supporting infrastructure that meet the financial services needs of DoD
users across the range of military operations. (DoDD 3020.40)
Global Information Grid - The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information
capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing,
disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and
support personnel. The Global Information Grid includes owned and leased
communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications),
data, security services, other associated services and National Security Systems. Also
called GIG. (JP 6-0)
Global Information Grid (GIG) Defense Sector - The globally interconnected, end-to-end
set of information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting,
processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters,
policy makers, and support personnel including all owned and leased communications
and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security
services, and other associated services necessary to achieve information superiority. It
also includes National Security Systems as defined in Section 5142 of the Clinger-Cohen
Act of 1996 (reference (g)). (DoDD 3020.40)
Global Information Infrastructure - The worldwide interconnection of communications
networks, computers, databases, and consumer electronics that make vast amounts of
information available to users. The global information infrastructure encompasses a wide
range of equipment, including cameras, scanners, keyboards, facsimile machines,
computers, switches, compact disks, video and audio tape, cable, wire, satellites, fiberoptic transmission lines, networks of all types, televisions, monitors, printers, and much
more. The friendly and adversary personnel who make decisions and handle the
transmitted information constitute a critical component of the global information
infrastructure. Also called GII. (JP 3-13)
Global Positioning System - A satellite constellation that provides highly accurate
position,velocity, and time navigation information to users. Also called GPS. (JP1-02)
Hazard (Infrastructure) - Non-hostile incidents such as accidents, natural forces,
technological failure, etc., that cause loss or damage to infrastructure assets. (DoDD
3020.40)
Health Affairs Defense Sector - The DoD, government and private sector worldwide
health care network and its supporting infrastructure that meet the health care needs of
DoD users across the range of military operations. (DoDD 3020.40)
Homeland — The physical region that includes the continental United States, Alaska,
Hawaii, United States possessions and territories, and surrounding territorial waters and
airspace. (JP 3-28)
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Homeland Defense — The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic
population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or
other threats as directed by the President. The DoD is responsible for Homeland Defense.
Also called HD. (JP 3-27)
Information - 1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. The meaning that a
human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation.
(JP 3-13.1)
Information Management — The function of managing an organization’s information
resources by the handling of knowledge acquired by one or many different individuals
and organizations in a way that optimizes access by all who have a share in that
knowledge or a right to that knowledge. (JP 3-0)
Information Operations — The integrated employment of the core capabilities of
electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military
deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related
capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated
decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 3-13)
Information Security — The protection of information and information systems against
unauthorized access or modification of information, whether in storage, processing, or
transit, and against denial of service to authorized users. Also called INFOSEC.
(JP 3-13)
Information Superiority — The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect,
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or
denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. (JP 3-13)
Information System — The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and
components for the collection, processing, storage, transmission, display, dissemination,
and disposition of information. (JP 3-13)
Infrastructure - The framework of networked assets that comprise identifiable industries,
institutions, or distribution capabilities that enable a continued flow of goods and
services. (DoDD 3020.40)
Installation Preparedness. - The integration of key activities on DoD installations and
facilities that address all efforts pertaining to prevention, detection, protection, response,
and remediation against all threats and hazards. (DoDD 3020.40)
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Defense Sector - The DoD,
government and private sector worldwide facilities, networks, and systems that conduct
and support the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence, surveillance and
71

reconnaissance information, in support of activities that meet the needs of DoD users
across the range of military operations. (DoDD 3020.40)
Inter-Dependency - Relationships or connections between entities of different functions,
networks, sectors, or services. (DoDD 3020.40)
Intra-Dependency - Relationships or connections between entities within a common
function, network, sector, or service. (DoDD 3020.40)
Local Government - any county, city, village, town, district, or other political subdivision
of any state, any Native American tribe or authorized tribal organization, or Alaska native
village or organization, and includes any rural community or unincorporated town or
village or any other public entity for which an application for assistance is made by a
state or political subdivision thereof. (National Strategy for Homeland Security)
Logistics Defense Sector. The DoD, government, and private sector worldwide facilities,
networks, and systems that support the provision of supplies and services to U.S. forces.
(DoDD 3020.40)
Military Support to Civil Authorities — A mission of civil support consisting of support
for natural or man-made disasters, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or highyield explosive consequence management, and other support as required. Also called
MSCA. (DODD 3025.1)
Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies — A mission of civil support
that includes support to civilian law enforcement agencies. This includes but is not
limited to: combating terrorism, counterdrug operations, national security special events,
and national critical infrastructure and key asset protection. Also called MSCLEA.
(DODD 3025.1)
Mission Assurance - A process to ensure that assigned tasks or duties can be performed
in accordance with the intended purpose or plan. It is a summation of the activities and
measures taken to ensure that required capabilities and all supporting infrastructures are
available to the DoD to carry out the National Military Strategy. It links numerous risk
management program activities and security related functions—such as force protection;
antiterrorism; critical infrastructure protection; information assurance; continuity of
operations; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive defense;
readiness; and installation preparedness—to create the synergistic effect required for
DoD to mobilize, deploy, support, and sustain military operations throughout the
continuum of operations. (DoDD 3020.40)
Mitigation - Actions taken in response to a warning or after an incident occurs that are
intended to lessen the potentially adverse effects on a given military operation or
infrastructure. (DoDD 3020.40)
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Monitoring and Reporting - The collection, fusion, and dissemination of intelligence
based indications and warning, DoD asset and civil infrastructure readiness reporting, law
enforcement information, man-made or natural hazards, and suspicious security event
reporting, that can adversely impact mission readiness. (DoDD 3020.40)
National Command Authority - The President of the United States or the Secretary of
Defense ability to exercise authority and control of the Armed Forces. (JP-1)
National Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets — The infrastructure and assets vital to a
nation’s security, governance, public health and safety, economy, and public confidence.
They include telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil distribution and
storage, water supply systems, banking and finance, transportation, emergency services,
industrial assets, information systems, and continuity of government operations. Also
called NCI&KA. (JP 3-28)
National Defense Strategy — A document approved by the Secretary of Defense for
applying the Armed Forces of the United States in coordination with Department of
Defense agencies and other instruments of national power to achieve national security
strategy objectives. Also called NDS. (JP 3-0)
National Emergency — A condition declared by the President or the Congress by virtue
of powers previously vested in them that authorize certain emergency actions to be
undertaken in the national interest. Action to be taken may include partial, full, or total
mobilization of national resources. (JP 3-28)
National Incident Management System — A national crisis response system that provides
a consistent, nationwide approach for Federal, state, local, and tribal governments; the
private sector; and nongovernmental organizations to work effectively and efficiently
together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of
cause, size, or complexity. Also called NIMS. (JP 3-41)
National Information Infrastructure — The nationwide interconnection of
communications networks, computers, databases, and consumer electronics that make
vast amounts of information available to users. The national information infrastructure
encompasses a wide range of equipment, including cameras, scanners, keyboards,
facsimile machines, computers, switches, compact disks, video and audio tape, cable,
wire, satellites, fiber-optic transmission lines, networks of all types, televisions, monitors,
printers, and much more. The friendly and adversary personnel who make decisions and
handle the transmitted information constitute a critical component of the national
information infrastructure. Also called NII. (JP 3-13)
National Military Strategy — A document approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff for distributing and applying military power to attain national security strategy
and national defense strategy objectives. Also called NMS. (JP 3-0)
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National Operations Center — The primary national hub for domestic incident
management operational coordination and situational awareness. A standing 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week interagency organization fusing law enforcement, national
intelligence, emergency response, and private-sector reporting. Also called NOC. (JP 328)
National Response Coordination Center — A multiagency center that provides overall
federal response and recovery coordination for incidents of national significance and
emergency management program implementation. This center is a functional component
of the national operations center. Also called NRCC. (JP 3-28)
National Security — A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign
relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a. a military or
defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. a favorable foreign
relations position; or c. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or
destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. (JP1-02)
National Security Council — A governmental body specifically designed to assist the
President in integrating all spheres of national security policy. The President, Vice
President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense are statutory members. The
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs serve as advisers. Also called
NSC. (JP1-02)
National Security Interests — The foundation for the development of valid national
objectives that define US goals or purposes. National security interests include preserving
US political identity, framework, and institutions; fostering economic well-being; and
bolstering international order supporting the vital interests of the United States and its
allies. (JP1-02)
National Security Strategy - A document approved by the President of the United States
for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve
objectives that contribute to national security. Also called NSS. (JP 3-0)
Network - A group or system of interconnected or cooperating entities, normally
characterized as being nodes (assets) and the connections that link them. (DoDD
3020.40)
North American Aerospace Defense Command — A bi-national command of the US and
Canada that provides aerospace surveillance, warning and assessment of aerospace
attack, and maintains the sovereignty of US and Canadian airspace. Also called NORAD.
(JP1-02)
Operational Net Assessment (ONA) - A continuously updated operational support tool
that provides a JTF commander visibility of effects-to-task linkages based on a "system74

of-systems" analysis of a potential adversary's political, military, economic, social,
infrastructure, and information (PMESII) war-making capabilities. The ONA informs
decision-makers from strategic to tactical levels regarding the complementary effects and
supporting missions and tasks that can be considered when applying the full range of
diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) actions to achieve specific
effects on an adversary's will and capability in support of national objectives. ONA is a
critical enabler for achieving rapid decisive operations. It is an integrated, collaborative
product of Department of Defense and other appropriate government and nongovernment organizations. Its purpose is to identify key links and nodes within the
adversary's systems and to propose methods that will influence, neutralize or destroy
them and achieve a desired effect or outcome. (USJFCOM Glossary)
Personnel Defense Sector - The DoD, government, and private sector worldwide network
that coordinates and supports personnel and human resource functions of DoD personnel.
(DoDD 3020.40)
Posse Comitatus Act — Prohibits search, seizure, or arrest powers to US military
personnel. Amended in 1981 under Public Law 97-86 to permit increased Department of
Defense support of drug interdiction and other law enforcement activities. (Title 18, “Use
of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus” - United States Code, Section 1385) (JP1-02)
Protect – reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or key resources in order to
deter, mitigate, or neutralize terrorist attacks.
Public Works Defense Sector - The DoD, government, and private sector worldwide
network, including the real property inventories (environment, land, buildings, and
utilities), that manages the support, generation, production, and transport of commodities
(e.g., electric power, oil and natural gas, water and sewer, emergency services, etc.) for
and to DoD users. (DoDD 3020.40)
Remediation - Actions taken to correct known deficiencies and weaknesses. These
actions are undertaken once a vulnerability has been identified. (DoDD 3020.40)
Reserve Components - Reserve Components of the Armed Forces of the United States
are: a.the Army National Guard of the United States; b. the Army Reserve; c. the Naval
Reserve; d. the Marine Corps Reserve; e. the Air National Guard of the United States; f.
the Air Force Reserve; and g. the Coast Guard Reserve. Also called RCs. (JP 4-05)
Risk - Probability and severity of loss linked to threats or hazards. (DoDD 3020.40)
Risk Assessment – is a systematic examination of risk, using disciplined processes,
methods, and tools. It provides an environment for decision making to continuously
evaluate and prioritize risks and recommend strategies to remediate or mitigate those
risks. (DoDD 3020.40)
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Risk Management - A process by which decision makers accept, reduce, or offset risk.
(DoDD 3020.40)
Sector-Specific Agency – federal department or agency responsible for infrastructure
protection activities in a designated critical infrastructure sector or key resources
category.
Secure – reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or key resources in order to
deter, mitigate, or neutralize terrorist attacks.
Space Defense Sector - The DoD, government, and private sector worldwide network,
including both space- and ground-based systems and facilities, that supports launch,
operation, maintenance, specialized logistics, control systems, etc., for DoD users.
State - any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Canal Zone, the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, or the trust territory of the Pacific Islands. (National Strategy for
Homeland Security)
Strategy - A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power
in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational
objectives. (JP 3-0)
Theater Strategy - Concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives
of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and
integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power.
(JP 3-0)
Threat - An adversary having the intent, capability, and opportunity to cause loss or
damage. (DoDD 3020.40)
Transportation Defense Sector - The DoD, government, and private sector worldwide
network that provides U.S. military lift support (surface, sea, and air) for military
operations. (DoDD 3020.40)
Vulnerability (Infrastructure) - The characteristics of an installation, system, asset,
application, or its dependencies that could cause it to suffer a degradation or loss
(incapacity to perform its designated function) as a result of having been subjected to a
certain level of threat or hazard. (DoDD 3020.40)
Vulnerability Assessment (Infrastructure) - A systematic examination of the
characteristics of an installation, system, asset, application, or its dependencies to identify
vulnerabilities. (DoDD 3020.40)
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